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The bird of time
Has but a little way to fly -
And, io,
The bird is on the wing.
- Omar Khayyam  
The Rubaiyat
A. Introduction
1. This paper is a prologue and contribution to designing a strategic approach to 
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Restructuring, over 1994 - 1996, of production, 
livelihoods, basic human and social investments, supporting services and 
infrastructure, as well as the involvement therein of Somali civil society and local 
(through regional) governance.
2. It is not an emergency survival programme prospectus. It pre supposes that the 
basic survival crisis will have been resolved and some foundations will have been laid 
for reconstruction during 1993, along the broad lines of the 1993 UNDP Programme
proposals - even if the more reconstruction-oriented elements of that Programme 
clearly cannot be carried out in full in 1993.
3. Emergency survival is necessarily (to use an immunisation analogy) a "grab and 
jab" operation. Today, it is necessary to vaccinate as many children as possible 
against measles and mothers and children against tetanus. It is also necessary to push 
out as much knowledge and materials on oral rehydration and as much nutritional 
supplementing foods as feasible. Parallels exist in other areas. Holding back in order 
to do full assessments (indeed, any beyond approximate numbers at risk), to design 
medium term procedures or institutional structures, or to operate normally high priority 
components for user dialogue and participation, would be most inappropriate today. 
There can be no rehabilitation for the dead (at least not in this world, which is the 
limit of UN ICEF's remit).
4. A  parallel component - which does look somewhat beyond immediate survival (even 
though that is an important consideration) - is tackling projects for livelihoods, 
nutrition and basic services which are self-evident and quickly implementable. O X F A M  
(UK)'s  two projects for rehabilitation of smallscale irrigated production by farming 
communities in river basins, UNDP's Mogadishu water supply interim restoration and 
UNICEF's parallel project at Hargeisa are ongoing examples. FA O 's  proposal to 
rehabilitate livestock export quarantine stations (in the 1993 UNDP Programme) is an 
example of what can be added this year. These initiatives do look to reconstruction 
and livelihood rehabilitation and do involve more complex analysis and 
procedural/institutional structures than "grab and jab". But they are limited to what 
is contextually feasible here and now, and so cannot form, in themselves, an overall 
reconstruction and rehabilitation (let alone restructuring) framework or strategy.
5. The assumptions on the external context for 1994-1996 include:
a. by 1994, relative security and accessibility nationally (comparable to present 
situations in the North West and North East), and improving thereafter;
b. by 1994 and especially by 1996, increase in capacity of Somali civil society 
(village, nomadic group, neighbourhood and domestic NGO) and of local 
governance (town through regional);
c. no functional/operational national government by 1994. No assumption is 
made on the position by 1996, although emergence of a national government 
by then would facilitate the design and implementation of the proposed 1994- 
96 strategic programme;
d. no devastating drought year over the 1993/94 to 1996/97 crop cycles, and 
not more than one moderate drought year (which is optimistic).
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6. As used here, "reconstruction'' refers primarily to physical facilities and macro 
balances; "rehabilitation" refers primarily to household livelihoods, food security, 
access to basic services and to institutional/governance capacity; while 
"restructuring" applies to sectors (notably education, health, water) which were 
already nearing collapse by 1987-89 and would - as structured - have been wholly 
unsustainable in the 1990s even in the absence of war. All three must be based on 
a working knowledge of pre-1987 Somali magnitudes, structures, dynamics and 
weaknesses. In that respect, this report draws heavily on a 1987 Report for U N IC E F  
by V  Jamal and the present author.
7. The reasons for presenting an approach for 1994-96 n o w  are threefold:
a. it can help to provide a framework and reference point for survival support 
in 1993 - especially for the livelihood, nutrition and basic service project 
components;
b. it will take time to shift to the more detailed analysis, feasibility designing 
and consultation/participation required for the rehabilitation-restructuring- 
planning process;
c. if substantial progress in implementation in 1994-96 is to be achieved, the 
1994 component must be ready for the mobilisation of financial support and 
final implementation design by September 1993 (to allow for a rolling start as 
of March 1994).
B. Population, Displaced Persons: Numbers and Flows
8. The probable resident population of Somalia in early 1993 is 4 .5  million (4.31 - 
4 .6 6  million - for details of estimation see Table 1 -A ). Of this total, about 1.45 million 
( 3 2 % ,  range 1.3 - 1.6m) are internally displaced or with wiped-out livelihoods and 
homes, though still living in or near ruins (for details of estimation see Table 2-D).
9. Externally displaced persons (refugees) probably number on the order of 1 .04 
million (range 0.95 - 1.1m - for details of estimation see Table 1 -B). Taken together, 
internally displaced persons plus refugees total about 4 5 %  of the refugee plus resident 
population (comparable to 5 0 %  for Mozambique).
10. These rough baseline totals are relevant to programming for food security  and 
return home  (a much more accurate and descriptive term than "resettlement"). In 
particular, total levels of return home which can be achieved in 1993 and over 1994- 
96 are constrained, and large numbers of early refugee returns will imply delayed 
return home for displaced persons or long stays in "holding camps" in Somalia on 
return - neither a very desirable prospect.
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11. In respect to displaced persons, there are significant intra-urban, urban-to-urban, 
urban-to-rural and rural-to-rural groups (Table 1-D).
12. Perhaps one third each of total displaced persons were in the nomadic, agro­
pastoral/agricultural and urban resident groups before 1988-92.
13. Considering security, transport and livelihood rehabilitation constraints, a possible 
(but optimistic) target scenario for returns home would be:
* 1993: 250,000 - 300,000 (largely in riverain agriculture)
* 1994: 250,000 - 350,000
* 1994/96: 600,000 - 700,000
leaving still displaced b y  the end of 1996  (including population increase) some
175,000 - 250,000, consisting primarily of:
a. members of nomadic or rainfed agro-pastoral households who cannot return 
home because of herd wipeout, leaving no livelihood to return to (1 0 0 ,0 0 0  - 
150,000);
b. persons from districts/provinces now occupied by different and non-friendly 
clans/subclans (e.g. Gedio) (25,000 - 50,000);
c. persons in households who have otherwise irrevocably lost land use claims 
and (at least through 1996) jobs in the plantation sector (50,000 -basically 
Swahili minority community members).
14. If the 175,000 - 250,000 long term internally displaced group is to be reduced, 
additional actions will be needed to complement those outlined in subsequent 
sections:
a. purchase of core herds (roughly 60-80 sheep/goats, 25 cattle, 10 camels or 
a combination thereof - comparable to the recommendation of the Second 
Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance Group 1 and to other 
informed estimates), to make return home feasible. Sheep/goats and camels 
could probably be sourced in the NW/NE but cattle are much more doubtful 
because the national herd was dominantly in the central and southern areas. 
The herds in these areas are (as of early 1993) only 30 - 5 0 %  of normal 
(1987/89) levels, so additional purchases for wiped-out households there are 
not likely to be feasible;
b. expansion of smallscale irrigation through increased area and/or conversion
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of some former large estate areas to household agriculture. Land availability 
constraints apply to the first case and cost constraints to both. Given that 
suitable locations are limited, basically only South and Eastern Hawie in the 
Shebelle's, South Darod in Lower Juba, Swahili in both, and Issak in West 
Galbeed/Audal irrigated crescent would wish to (or could confidently in terms 
of safety) return to or resettle in this way;
c. either early re-opening of large plantations or inauguration of full scale 
rehabilitation to generate up to 7,500 jobs (benefitting 50,000 plus household 
members) - but virtually all in Lower Juba.
15. Refugees are predominantly in Ethiopia and Kenya with secondary clusters in 
Saudi Arabia/Yemen and Italy/Canada (Table 1-A). Probably at least half are from the 
nomadic group with one fifth to one quarter each former agro- 
pastoralists/agriculturalists and urban resident group members.
16. It is likely that about 3 0 %  of refugees will wish to return as soon as relative 
security is attained in their home areas; 5 0 %  after 1 - 2 years of stability in home 
areas; 2 0 %  later or never. This suggests feasible 1993-1996 targets/levels:
* 1993: up to 150,000 (largely to the North West)
* 1994: up to 150,000 (largely along Ethiopian border)
* 1995-96: 600,000
* Post 1996 or never: 2 20,000 .
17. The constraints are multiple: objective security conditions; refugee perceptions of 
prospects for security and stability; feasibility or otherwise of direct cross-border 
movements (with pioneers going ahead while others remain in "base" camp); 
mechanics of transport home (given insecurity of passage through hostile sub-clan 
areas); cost and limits to total return home/livelihood capacity for internally displaced 
and refugee (externally displaced) households.
18. Unfortunately the above review suggests that relatively few of the refugees now 
in Kenya (except perhaps those from Lower Juba) are likely to be willing or able to 
return home prior to 1995-96. If this delayed phasing is impossible (for whatever 
reasons) then only two realistic options appear to exist:
a. establishing long-stay transit camps for returning refugees in their home 
districts; and/or
b. reducing internally displaced return home flows, leaving more of the 
internally displaced to return home later than 1996.
Either of these appears more costly in human and social terms to refugees and 
internally displaced persons, and in financial terms to programme supporters, than the 
route leaving roughly 200,000 each internal and external displaced persons to return 
home after 1996 or not at all.
19. Because it is disproportionately difficult for nomadic (or rainfed agro-pastoralist) 
households who have lost their herds to return to their previous livelihoods, the p o st­
return population pattern is likely to be:
* Nomadic: 25 - 3 0 %  (1987: 35 - 4 0 % )
* Agro-pastoralist/
Agriculturalist: 3 0 %  (1987: 3 0 % )
* Urban: 40 - 4 5 %  (1987: 30 - 3 5 % )
(See Table 1-C for more detailed presentation).
C. Minority Community
20. Somalia has two non-Somali minority communities - Oromo (perhaps 4 0 ,000) and 
Swahili (of the order of 250,000 - 300,000). (While both do speak what linguists term 
technically as "bantu languages" it is unsound to use the term "bantu" to describe the 
communities because in the Somali context that word has overtones similar to those 
in the Afrikaner context).
21. The Oromo are largely refugees from Ethiopia (up to 35,000 on recent 
unconfirmed estimates). Almost all could - if assisted - and probably wish to return 
home to Ethiopia. UN HCR should undertake that exercise promptly.
22. The Swahili are in a different position. The oldest group dates from the 15/16th 
Century when Kismayu was temporarily the northernmost of the Coastal Swahili City 
States with posts at Brava and Merca. The majority, however, came as slaves in the 
18th and 19th Centuries working on Somali cotton and sugar plantations.
23. This community's position was increasingly insecure and weak in the 1980s. 
Most were river valley farmers without formal access to water (and with imperfect
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titles), plantation workers and/or low income urban workers (in service occupations, 
cap making and - perhaps - fishing). The farmers had some access to water for 
themselves and limited stock through working for river bank title holders. The 
plantation workers had plots, water access and bananas as a portion of their 
emoluments.
24. The war has been catastrophic for the Swahili community:
a. the plantations are closed and Lower Juba is very insecure;
b. the irrigation on the Shebelle's is largely non-functional with negative knock- 
on effects to users upslope from the immediate riverside area and security is 
(or has been) largely absent;
c. urban employment has collapsed;
d. the Swahili have no clan or sub-clan to advance their claims/defend their 
rights.
25. Unconfirmed estimates suggest 250,000 Swahili persons in Lower Juba and the 
Shebelle's, of whom  2 0 0 ,0 0 0  are believed to be displaced or pauperised near ruins 
of former homes.
26. Except in respect to encouraging the rehabilitation of plantation employment, no 
desirable programme would be disproportionately beneficial to this minority. However, 
return home, agricultural reconstruction/livelihood rehabilitation and restructured basic 
service programmes can benefit them equally with other river basin residents of 
Somalia. It is important to ensure that Swahili households do, in fact, have equal 
access to these programmes.
D. Food Security - National and Household
27. Somalia is very food insecurity today both nationally and for most households. 
The assumption that this was true prior to 1990 is, however, basically inaccurate.
28. As of 1987-89 Somalia (excluding refugees in Somalia) was basically-to-ful/y self- 
sufficient in maize, sorghum, bananas, meat, milk, fish, fruits and vegetables (80 to 
8 5 %  of calories). It was largely self-provisioning in beans and vegetable oil ( 6 % )  and 
basically import dependent in respect to sugar, rice, wheat (including flour and pasta) 
and miscellaneous items (squash, margarine, tinned goods, etc) with imports totalling 
perhaps 1 0 -1 2 %  of calories (6 to 7 %  in the dominantly import categories and 4 to 
5 %  in grain/wheat products, beans and cooking oil). Table 1-A, B present more 
detailed estimation. Coffee and tea (joint items in use with sugar) were also imported.
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29. Somalia's main exports were livestock and bananas (over $ 100 million and $ 25 
million respectively) and its secondary ones included fruit (watermelon, mangos, 
grapefruit to Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia) and fish (presumably to Djibouti and 
perhaps Hodeida/Jeddah) and were largely unrecorded (perhaps $ 5m fruit and $2m 
fish). These very substantially exceeded food imports in value (if not necessarily in 
calorie terms). Arguably therefore Somalia was relatively food secure nationally, with 
non-refugee commercialised food aid more a contribution to government revenue and 
overall import capacity (like petroleum aid in kind) than to food security per se.
30. 1980-1987 estimates from surveys suggest 15 - 2 0 %  rural and 12 - 15%  urban 
moderate and severe child malnutrition, and a poverty incidence (at a somewhat 
higher cutoff point than absolute poverty line) perhaps one third for the nomadic and  
agro-pastora/ist/agriculturalgroups and under 10%  for urban groups. (Up to 6 0 %  of 
urban consumption was financed from remittances; 2 0 %  from wages and fringe 
benefits including decentralised, privatised user fees; 5 - 1 0 %  from commerce at 
barrow trade level and above; and 1 0 %  from informal sector activities including 
pavement trading, domestic service, artisanal fishing). Substantial regional, provincial, 
drought-related and seasonal diversity existed, but was poorly documented. The 
fragmentary (and contradictory) evidence is reviewed in some detail in the 1987 
Report for U N IC E F  by V  Jamal and R Green.
31. The position in 1993 is very different (see Table 1-C) with domestic food 
production unlikely to exceed 2 0 %  of 1987/89 levels (excluding meat for domestic 
consumption and milk which may stand at 3 0 -4 0 %  of base levels). The March 1993 
UNDP projection of WFP/ICRC confirmed grain commitments of 337,000  tonnes, if 
augmented by 38 ,000  - 63 ,000 tonnes from other agencies, would probably allow 
approximate balance of grain requirements/uses (Table 1-C). However, additional 
commitments for beans, vegetable oil, sugar and supplementary feeding mixes (e.g. 
UNIMIX) would appear to be needed. The commercial imports estimates relate largely 
to Bosaso (NE) and Berbera (NW ) and appear consistent with fragmentary data on port 
use (largely by dhow), sheep and goat exports and possible remittance inflows. To  
date, the NE and N W  (the least insecure and - excluding secure areas in Mogadishu -
most accessible, albeit also the regions with least interference with production from 
drought and current conflict) have received minimal food aid even though there are 
several hundred thousand internally displaced persons and externally displaced 
persons (refugees), to whom food aid could serve as working capital toward livelihood 
rehabilitation and return home.
32. By 1994 it is possible (see Table 1-D and also the agriculture section below) to 
aim for non-meat/milk domestic output of around one third of the 1987/89 base. Food 
aid requirements would appear to be of the order of 200-250 ,0 00  tonnes of grain and 
15 - 17,000 tonnes of other commodities (with UNIMIX in addition) for free 
distribution or (literally) food-for-work. Some 100,000 tonnes of grain (especially rice 
and wheat) and 40 - 42,500 tonnes of other commodities (sugar, vegetable oil, beans)
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would be needed for commercialisation and as part of rebuilding Somali quasi- 
autonomous institutions and local governance finance capacity (as discussed in the 
revenue sub-section of the section on governance below).
33. The basic 1996 food production target can be set at 7 0 %  of 1987/89, again
excluding milk/meat for domestic market which should be able to reach 8 0 %  (over
1 0 0 %  in the N W -N E and 6 0 -6 5 %  in the Centre and South). By then, food aid for free
distribution could be reduced to 57,500 - 60,000 tonnes but there would still be a 
need for 160,000 tonnes for commercialisation for budgetary and import support uses 
(Table 2-E).
34. Overall, the targeted 1996 availability levels would restore the average per capita 
supply to about the 1987 position. However, because of the remaining displaced 
persons and households whose livelihoods have not been fully rehabilitated, there is 
likely to be a somewhat higher level of household poverty and perhaps of moderate 
child malnutrition compared to 1987.
E. Agriculture: Livestock. Crops and Fish
35. Agriculture in 1987 was based on 114,000 hectares of irrigated and 565,000 
hectares of rainfed cropping (albeit the latter varied sharply with rainfall); over 29 
million sheep and goats; over 4 million head of cattle; over 6 million camels; a small 
artisinal and a smaller inshore trawling fishing industry. In 1987/88 these produced 
of the order of 1,100 tonnes of crops; an offtake of the order to 6 million sheep and 
goats, 8 0 0,000  head of cattle and perhaps 400,000 camels; and 25 - 47 ,5 0 0  tonnes 
of fish (Table 2 -A ; Jamal and Green). Together they provided livelihoods for 60 - 6 5 %  
of Somalis.
36. The 1993 position (as shown in Table 2-c) is very much worse:
* Crop production is down 8 0 % ;
* Most of the irrigation system is out of production with silted channels and 
looted, broken down or fuel-less pumps. The banana, sugar and rice estate 
plantations are out of production with central pumping stations and factories 
destroyed;
* Outside the NW/NE (where herds may be 6 0 %  to 7 5 %  of 1987 levels) stock 
herds are probably well below the 5 0 %  level and in some areas approaching the 
3 0 %  level below which full recovery in less than 6 or 7 years of good weather 
(a decade's worth or more in Somalia) is virtually impossible, and traditional 
coping mechanisms (loan of stock repaid in kind from progeny) to allow a 
wiped-out family to claw back to an adequate herd (60 to 80 goats, 20 to 25
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cattle, 10 camels or a combination)  are unable to function;
* None of the four quarantine stations (Berbera, Bosaso, Mogadischu, Kismayu) 
is functional, leading to export proceed reductions of up to 6 0 %  (no direct 
access to the Saudi market);
* The public sector livestock borehole system (rapidly nearing collapse in 1987) 
is nearly derelict and the nomadic and merchant spring, birket, well and 
borehole ones have suffered heavily from war damage and non-maintenance;
* Mines - especially in parts of Northwest and near Bardhere and Baidoa - limit 
safely accessible areas;
* Rural security (to till, herd, move herds or commercialise products), although 
currently improving, remains fragmentary and on balance barely adequate (e.g. 
Lower Juba, Gedo) outside the Northeast and Northwest;
* No trawlers or chilled fish stores appear to be operating and artisinal catches 
are limited by worn out or repairworthy boats, plus lack of adequate nets, 
spares and fuel.
37. In one sense the list of disasters is the basis for selection of priority reconstruction 
projects. It is, however, a partial basis, because priority must be given to elements 
with quick livelihood rehabilitation, output and export pay-off. In addition, certain 
institutions - notably estate plantations and much of the veterinary infrastructure - 
require evaluation and, probably, at least partial restructuring rather than straight 
reconstruction.
38. Irrigation rehabilitation for smallscale farmers is a priority on which O X F A M (U K ) 
and S C F(U S A ) have made a start which demonstrates feasibility. The requirements 
are:
a. mechanical clearning of main canals;
b. tools for clearing of secondary canals by farmers now on their farms;
c. probably food or cash for work to support clearing of secondary canals by 
internally displaced or refugee farmers returning home;
d. initial free access to seed (backed by hiring some farmers to replicate 
selected local - not hybrid - seed), followed by an agency or NGO supplier of 
last resort backup to household saving from harvest and buying from 
merchants;
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e. a buyer of last resort (logically WFP) to buy up pockets of surplus (which are 
already appearing) until the commercial system is restored;
f. provision of initial fuel supplies (until a reliable commercial network exists 
again) as well as pump spares and replacement pumps. (In Lower Juba a 
majority of hectarage is pump irrigated, in the Shebelle's a majority is gravity 
fed, with Upper Juba intermediate). Suprisingly many - though by no means all 
- small pumps are operational.
39. Once irrigation capacity is restored (8 0 %  or more in the household sector should 
be possible by end-1996) irrigated farmers should renew access to human and animal 
water in return for labour contractual agreements with upslope farmers. Such access 
rights are crucial to enable upslope farmers to restart production.
40. This sub-sector produced about 700,000 tonnes in the late 1980s - well over half 
the total output.
41. Plantation irrigated agriculture will be slower to rehabilitate. Basically, it comprises 
a banana complex (perhaps 15,000 ha) and a sugar estate (about 5 ,000 ha). The 
former was irrigated by one main high-lift pumping station and produced over
100,000 tonnes of bananas (three quarters exported to Italy), while the latter was at 
least partly gravity-irrigated and produced 7,000 - 12,000 tonnes a year in a 50,000 
tonne capacity plant. The banana complex in Lower Juba and the Jow har sugar estate 
in Middle Shebelle accounted for about 1 0 %  of crop output. A  rice estate (2 ,500  ha, 
pump) was nearing completion in 1990 but never entered production.
42. The banana plantation would require some $ 100 - 125 million to restore the 
pumping station and packing material plant and to replant the groves which died after 
irrigation stopped. Production could begin 24 months after a decision. Italy - under 
new EC banana import arrangements - has the right to rehabilitate SomaloFruit and 
provide a premium price market. If for historic or aid-to-Somalia reasons it wishes to 
do so, it should be encouraged. If it so decides in early 1994, production could begin 
by late 1995.
43. The ex-sugar area poses different issues. To rehabilitate the sugar estate whose 
factory is totally destroyed would cost $ 250 - 300 million. For 10,000 tonnes a year 
that would be absurd; even for 50,000 tonnes the value of annual output of $ 10 
million appears grossly unsatisfactory. There is no doubt that the land should be 
rehabilitated but an agronomic study in 1994 is a priority to survey potential use 
alternatives (e.g. rice for the domestic market, fruit such as grapefruit, mangos, 
pineapples for the Djibouti and Arabian Peninsular markets).
44. Rainfed agriculture (which has typical yields of well under a tonne per hectare 
except in unusually good years) produced about 3 0 %  of total crop output. It is located
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primarily in Bay and the Shebelle's and secondarily in west Galbeed, Gedo, the Jubas, 
Bakool and Hiraan.
45. Very special rehabilitation needs exist because all such farmers need to be agro­
pastoral. Only in one year of two can decent crops (by Somali rainfed standards) be 
expected so that a significant livestock and/or milk output are needed for income and 
food security. Many of these farmers are now displaced and have lost most or all of 
their stock. The potential for core herd loans is considered below.
46. Setting the herd problem to one side, the key needs are seeds, handtools and 
restoration of water supplies (usually boreholes or birkets) for human and animal use.
47. Pastoralism  has three main sub-categories - nomadic, agro-pastoral (dryland 
farmers) and agro-pastoral (wetland farmers). All face the need for restoration of 
access to vaccinations against a known list of diseases and to a limited list of 
veterinary drugs and the first two categories for water point network rehabilitation. 
Their problems in respect to herd size restoration are quite distinct with the 
Northwest/Northeast a special sub-case because herd sizes there are adequate to 
allow natural regeneration and traditional intra-household cluster loans to allow wiped- 
out members to restore their herds.
48. While there was a massive veterinary/livestock infrastructure in the late 1980s, 
it was collapsing from lack of maintenance and funding and should not be replicated 
on the same lines, but rather restructured to achieve sustainability. Actual services 
were limited to: vaccination; a referral laboratory/vaccine production unit; and four 
port quarantine stations. No drugs were available via the veterinary sector (nor via the 
private commercial market legalised two years earlier) and the state borehole system 
was on its last legs.
49. Items of strategic importance for 1994-96 include:
a. reconstruction of the four quarantine stations (Berbera, Bosaso, Mogadishu, 
Kismayo) more or less on their pre-war lines. They can raise exports (and 
therefore farmer receipts up to 1 0 0 %  on direct exports to Saudi Arabia which 
requires certificates) in 1993/94. About 6 0 %  of all movements will be via 
Berbera and Bosaso (higher through 1996), 2 0 %  Mogadishu, 1 0 %  Kismayo and 
1 0 %  minor dhow ports. Cattle however are largely through Mogadishu and 
Kismayo;
b. creation of a basic vaccine and veterinary drug stock (including salt), 
analagous to that previously held by W HO/UNICEF for basic human drugs;
c. training village or nomadic para-veterinary personnel (chosen by herding 
groups) as Village Veterinary Health Workers to vaccinate and to treat common
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animal diseases. This could be done by hiring former veterinary officers as 
trainers. The V V H W s would be paid in kind by their villages/groups (as Village 
Health Workers and Koranic teachers were) and would provide a channel for 
selling vaccines, drugs and associated equipment perhaps via 20 ports staffed 
by former veterinary officers;
d. drilling of a limited number of strategic boreholes where access to water 
renders reasonable pastures unuseable and the wells and birket technology of 
nomadic groups is not adequate to reach water. These should be sited only 
after consultations with nomadic groups (water engineers are not experts on 
pastures).
50. A  special problem exists in respect to wiped-out pastoralists and dryland agro- 
pastoralists. A  core herd for the former would cost about $ 2 ,000 and for the latter 
about $ 1,200 (60 and 40 sheep respectively). If traditional kinship group coping 
mechanisms of loans in kind are not feasible because overall group stock levels are 
too low (below 30 - 4 0 %  of normal) then there is, at present, no w ay back - and the 
only w ay forward is to town and a most uncertain future livelihood.
51. A n  analogue to traditional loans in kind could be set up:
* loans to kin groups (perhaps in kind);
* re-lent to and repaid in kind by pastoralists and agro-pastoralists out of 
progeny over five years to the kin group;
* with half of kin group collection going into a revolving herd recovery fund of 
their own, and half into projects jointly agreed between the agency and the kin 
group.
52. Sheep and goats can be bought from the Northwest and Northeast, as can 
camels. Cattle would probably need to be purchased in Kenya.
53. The  problem is cost. To  rehabilitate 25,000 nomadic and 25,000 agro-pastoralist 
households (350,000  - 400,000 persons including family members) would cost $ 80 
million. If, however, the alternative to this is 400,000 internally and externally 
displaced persons whose livelihoods cannot be rehabilitated, this (at $ 200 per person) 
may be a good bargain.
54. Fishing  has two sectors - artisinal and commercial - of which the large-scale sub­
sector of the latter has long been dead (adequate, accessible fish stocks have never 
been proved - indeed experience suggests they are not there). The small-scale 
commercial sub-sector is dormant. It is just possible that a small programme making
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loans to rehabilitate small trawlers and associated cold rooms would be worth doing 
if any agency is particularly interested, but it is hardly a high priority.
55. Artisinal fishing is a priority for food security and livelihood reasons. The needed 
inputs are materials for rehabilitating boats, nets, small inboard and outboard motors, 
tools for boatbuilding, etc. The commercial sector could and would supply these if the 
artisinal fishermen had funds. Loans (say, 20-year) to artisinal fishing associations on- 
lent by them for shorter terms to members creating a revolving fund might be the 
most practical route forward, since direct external agency loans to artisinal fishermen 
will be hard to target, costly to manage and almost certainly will not be repaid. 
(Fishermen - like most Somalis - feel no moral obligation to large, strange, alien 
institutions domestic or external, but do to their own ethnic, business and other 
closely-knit groups. Further, repaying to a revolving fund has clear pay-offs which 
repaying to an external agency does not). Perhaps $ 2 - 3 million would be sufficient 
for a relatively large programme.
56. However, a precondition for success is effective market access. The two main 
artisinal fishing centres - Adale and Merca - have, at least until recently, suffered 
primarily from lack of of physical access to the dominant Mogadishu market. While 
effective demand today is far below 1987 levels, it should have recovered fully by 
1996 (and may perhaps be higher given the 1980-87 trend) if the other elements of 
this R-R-R strategic approach are implemented.
F. Commerce and Industry
57. In the case of commerce, Somali businessmen are in most respects able to look 
out for themselves. For promotion of nearby Indian Ocean markets for livestock, fish, 
fruit, frankincense and myrrh, no-one outside their group now associated with Somalia 
has the knowledge or experience to give them useful advice.
58. However, merchants do need access to some specialised infrastructure and 
services - as well as to rather more peace and security than now exist - if they are to 
prosper. T w o  cases - ports and quarantine stations - are mentioned elsewhere.
59. A  third is a limited (probably UHF) telecom net for phone and fax from Berbera, 
Bosaso, Mogadishu, Kismayo and perhaps Hargeisa to Djibouti, Jeddah, Hodeida, 
Nairobi and perhaps Aden. What are needed are a limited number of lines for public 
commercial use (charging full cost or above). Commerce requires sight and signature 
of documents (e.g. letters of credit, contracts) and up-to-date data on price and 
potential for deals. Having to go physically to an external city for this purpose is 
expensive in time even more than in money. A  similar business phone/fax domestic 
net linking the five main commercial towns (Berbera, Hargeisa, Bosaso, Modagishu, 
Kismayo) would also be useful (and will be able to pay its way) but is less important 
than the international.
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60. An interim partial response might be for UNDP or any other agency with surplus 
external phone/fax capacity to sell time on an "as available" basis to Djibouti and 
Nairobi.
61. Industry  in Somalia has rarely been successful. The sugar and tinned fish factories 
(for which there is talk of resuscitating) are glaring past examples. There is little 
reason to suppose they would do better now. Given reconstruction needs, the cement 
plant (if rehabilitation could be quick and low-cost) may be an exception. The logical 
operator/owner would be a foreign one or a joint foreign/Somali consortium. The snag 
is that the plant is a state asset which cannot very well be sold by the international 
community. Possibly a trustee could be appointed, empowered to least the plant for 
3 - 5  years in return for the new operator rehabilitating and reopening it. The same 
problem, incidentally, applies to Jowhar sugar, the fish tinning and most (not all) other 
factories in Somalia.
G. Livelihood Rehabilitation
62. Somali household livelihoods in 1987 came dominantly from livestock, crops, 
mixed crops-and-livestock and remittances. The programmatic initiatives proposed 
above will do much to restore the first three sources. The remaining one is 
remittances.
63. In 1987, remittances from migrant workers via clan-linked traders (who used the 
riyals to buy goods for importation) were probably of the order of $ 200 million and 
by family members in business abroad (particularly Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) also 
sent as goods, over $ 100 million (see Jamal and Green for a much fuller discussion). 
Most appeared to be consumed in urban areas and constituted up to 6 0 %  of urban 
income.
64. Present levels (with the possible exception of the North) are believed to be very 
low. But the earnings base for remittances remains - perhaps $ 75 - 100 million in 
Saudi Arabia, $ 25 million in Yemen, $ 1 0 - 1 5  million each in U A E, Italy and 
merchant shipping, $ 100 million from East African Somali businesses - for a potential 
total of perhaps $ 250 million. W hy is it not flowing? How could it be encouraged to 
do so again?
65. The simple answer is "by restoring trade" with the Arabian Peninsular and East 
Africa. Without traders, no channel for remitting exists (and nor would it have in 
1987, when only 1 0 %  of estimated total flows came via Somali banks). That requires 
greater safety of persons and goods, better communications facilities, and relatively 
normal functioning ports at Mogadishu and Kismayo as well as Berbera and Bosaso 
(which are already at or near that level). It also could be said to require greater urban
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Somali effective demand, but the remittances would go far toward providing that.
66. It is especially important to women and female-headed households that remittance 
flows build up again. Whereas in value terms, most remittances were to men, in 
numbers of recipients women may well have been ahead. And clearly remittances 
were a higher proportion of female and female-headed household income than of male.
67. No direct policy is needed. The indirect requirement is restoring security and 
supporting services for international commerce conducted by Somali businessmen.
H. Macro-Economics: Currency, Credit. Prices and All That
68. The Somali shilling has both of the attributes basic to confidence in and use of a 
currency:
* there is a finite (indeed, slowly decreasing) stock - no-one can issue any 
more:
* there is a regular major purchasing group which has no option but to buy 
large amounts (i.e. the international presence in Somalia).
The fact that no government backs the shilling is irrelevant - after all, the Spanish 
Reale (dollar/piece of eight) and Maria Theresa thaler (dollar) circulated in parts of the 
Horn well into the 20th Century although neither was the current currency of its state 
and Maria Theresas had arguably long ceased to exist.
69. Competition by local authority currencies will continue to fail. They have neither 
of the above attributes. Indeed, it is self-evident that local authorities would issue 
them as a simple way of acquiring resources. It is no accident that a glass of tea costs 
SoSh 500 in South Mogadishu and 15,000 North Mogadishu shillings in North 
Mogadishu.
70. By 1996, something will need to be done because the currency will literally be 
falling apart. An Institute of Emission will be needed, initially simply accepting 
(exchanging) the present SoSh for a New SoSh. Later it may wish to sell the New 
SoSh - at the market rate - for foreign exchange and vice versa - in fact becoming a 
traditional currency board.
71. Complaints that prices vary widely should not be directed at the currency, which 
shows signs of stabilising around 5000 to the US dollar. Divergences between North 
and South are closed rather quickly by shipment of notes back and forth. Sudden 
lurches upward appear related to UN system bulk purchases in Djibouti and would 
affect any currency with a volume which was quite small relative to a single bulk
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purchase. Divergences in prices of goods are high - as evidenced by the continued use 
of 100 and even 50 SoSh notes in the North because they will buy something there. 
But again that has nothing to do with the currency. It flows from different 
demand/supply balances in North and South which markets cannot readily close 
because of high transport costs. Improving communications and reducing transport 
costs is relevant to price equalisation. Monetary tinkering is not.
72. Banks in Somalia were only tangentially relevant to Somali commerce and credit 
in the 1980s. While they did handle letters of credit (their own were widely 
acceptable) this was not necessary to businessmen who received precious little credit 
from them. Basically they accepted and paid out cash and transferred balances 
between accounts. The depositaries (ex banks) in the Northwest do that, albeit they 
charge a fee for holding notes safe (thus going back perhaps 7 centuries to the origins 
of deposit banking). As with currency the present situation is one in which "don't just 
do something, stand still" is the relevant policy advice.
73. One credit institution might be worth testing (beyond the nomadic herd 
rehabilitation one and in a sense complementing it). That is a W om en's Credit Fund 
to make small loans to women's savings and credit associations (which do exist) to 
onlend to their members. So long as the collector/lender was a group to which the 
woman felt personal loyalty (which an externally-funded and established body 
certainly would not be), repayment rates are likely to be high.
74. Since females - especially heads of households - need small capitals for livelihood 
development and have very limited access to them through male business networks 
(which do lend/borrow among themselves), a good case can be made out.
75. Perhaps the most fruitful way forward would be to hire a manager from a 
successful Asian female (or largely female) clientele small loan institution for a 6- 
month feasibility and design study, carried out with a Somali professional woman and 
in association with a Somali women's organisation. If the findings were promising, a 
3 ( +  3) person team could be hired to begin work with/via women's savings and 
credit societies.
I. Transport and Power
76. These sectors' needs are relatively straightforward and fairly modest over 1994-
96. In order of urgency they are: ports; roads; airports.
77. All four main ports  are in basic working order. However, each needs some repairs 
to mobile cranes, forklifts, warehouses and pilot boats/tugs. In addition, they need 
functioning port authorities meeting recurrent costs from port dues and benefitting 
from some initial technical assistance (perhaps 8 persons of which 2 at Mogadishu,
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1 each at Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo and 3 specialists serving all four).
78. On roads, three quite different clusters exist: main roads (especially tarmac ones); 
secondary roads; city streets.
79. For the former, a prioritisation study followed by a set of ILO-led labour intensive 
reconstruction projects should work if followed up by creating mobile maintenance 
units (perhaps 5) from reconstruction personnel and equipment (Somalia has never 
previously maintained roads).
80. Secondary roads (with a few exceptions including some bridges) could be 
reconstructed by even more labour-intensive approaches (work projects paid from 
commercialised food aid funds) with a foreman, hand tools and perhaps a bulldozer. 
Maintenance might well be entrusted to local governance units with 5 0 %  of costs 
covered from counterpart funds and the balance from local levies (e.g. annual lump 
sums from main road users and communities on the line of road).
81. City streets can be reconstructed by largely labour intensive methods (as under 
the World Bank supported urban renewal project in Mozambique). The priorities are 
Mogadishu, Kismayo and Hargeisa.
82. P ow e r  poses problems. The pre-war system (which at least in Mogadishu was 
overloaded, unreliable and in bad repair at both generation and distribution levels) was 
heavily damaged and looted in the war. A  survey of what remains and what could be 
restored to working order at what cost is a first priority.
83. Full rehabilitation over 1994-96 is not practicable on cost grounds. But individual 
generators are expensive and unreliable. Phased restoration of at least unserviceable 
generators plus some distribution lines should be feasible, especially as distribution 
capacity and demand will also recover slowly. Once present urban generator users 
believe power will be available reliably (at a rate structure fully covering recurrent 
costs including maintenance plus depreciation on new investment), they are likely to 
be willing to pay a substantial portion of distribution system reconstruction costs as 
connection fees and deposits. As with ports, autonomous authorities should be set 
up initially with significant technical assistance support.
J .  Basic Services: Health. Education. Water
84. The basic problem with basic health, education and water programme design is 
not technical/professional. Relevant components of programmes are relatively well 
known, tested and seen as user-friendly in many South countries.
85. Nor, at this level, do the problems really relate to personnel. Trained Somalis exist,
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are now scattered in all regions and could - with limited, temporary technical 
assistance leadership - be rehired and retrained.
86. The problems centre rather on sustainability (of funding) and on access for 
nomads (to education and health). Somalia's history gives no useable answers. 
Education and water were success stories up to the late 1970s (although health never 
was, especially outside the four largest towns). They rapidly declined after this. By 
1987 the Ministry of Health purported to operate over 350 hospitals, clinics, Mother- 
Child Health clinics and specialised institutions on a budget of $ 1.5 million. Education 
and water were little better. The system plainly was headed for collapse which would 
have occurred on the then-prevailing trends by 1990 even in the absence of war (see 
Jamal and Green for more details on this situation and process).
87. And yet if capital budget funds which were wasted on new structures without 
operating funds are added to duplicative foreign government and external N G O 
systems (especially in health), the funds for proper basic health and education services 
and water supply were being expended, but with little to show for them.
88. A  possible way forward lies in two long-standing community based service 
networks: one in nomadic primary health care and one in Koranic schools, both 
depended heavily on user payments in kind and cash. The former benefited from 
central provision of training (central budget), specialised inputs (at cost to users) and 
supervision/advice (central). The latter had no such central Islamic body, and as a 
result had weak training and limited performance (although high enrollment) by the 
standards of more developed Islamic education systems.
89. The nomadic primary health approach dates to the British Administration in the 
then Somaliland Protectorate. Nomadic groups chose members to be trained in simple 
diagnostic, dispensing and first aid skills in 6 - 12 week courses. They then served 
their groups (part time as needed) in return for payment in milk, meat, smallstock and 
herding time. Basic drugs were provided via District Medical Officers at cost (with 
each tin literally returned with the right number of coins in it to secure a 
replacement!). In principle, the DMOs provided a referral and monitoring service but 
distances meant that both were effective only when groups were at dry season base 
camps.
90. This system never died out totally in West Galbeed. From the late 1970s it was 
revived and expanded under UNICEF auspices (hiring time from District Health Officers 
paid very little and with almost no drugs, furniture, linen or food to operate with in 
their nominal hospitals). In this version, it was spreading rapidly sn the m id-1980s, 
attracting growing community support (including among agro-pastoralist and river 
village communities) as well as backing from a growing group of donors and medical 
professionals, with tacit consent or benign neglect by the then government. If this had 
continued, a rural primary health network would have been in place by 1990. The
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revolution from 1988 on destroyed this approach, as it did its younger sister 
programme to train traditional birth attendants as basic M CH workers (which both 
they and mothers welcomed).
91. The Koranic schools were similar, except that they were national and, because 
most teachers were illiterate, they taught over 9 5 %  Koranic memorisation. In urban 
areas, fees were partly in cash, and in rural areas dominantly in kind. Nomadic 
payments were highly incentivising - a goat per term studied, a cow  when a given 
number of verses had been memorised, a camel when the whole of the Holy Koran 
had been committed to memory. Interestingly, a tiny but growing minority of schools 
taught Arabic, reading the Holy Koran and arithmetic as well as Koranic memorisation. 
Preliminary contacts had been made with regional Islamic education bodies to see how 
this trend could be strengthened and broadened (Jamal and Green suggested an 
approach to Al Hazar Islamic University in Cairo). Another interesting feature was that 
nomadic group Koranic teachers travelled with their students by camel (they too were 
nomads).
92. These two cases surely point the way forward for at least rural primary health 
services and primary plus basic adult education. Education lagged health in this 
respect in the 1980s because until 1980 there had been a dynamic, growing 
government system internationally perceived as one of the best in Africa and until 
1985 community contributions were legally forbidden. However, contributions to 
books, equipment, classrooms, teachers houses, fees - up to $ 0.60 a month per pupil 
or $ 18 - 24 a month to top up a basic salary of $ 7 - 10 per month) were becoming 
less uncommon especially in West Galbeed (including Hargeisa) and the Shabelle 
Valley. This suggests that the approach is viable in education as well as in health and 
in urban as well as rural areas. No nomadic cases existed but the Koranic education 
parallel suggests nomads trained as teachers might well be willing to travel with their 
pupils (a camel can carry a blackboard and a set of teacher's manuals as well as the 
other, quite austere gear of a Somali nomadic household).
93. The central inputs needed in this approach are: training, material distribution, 
monitoring, programme design and preferably correlated distance learning materials, 
radio programmes or cassettes (on health as well as education), and referral (e.g. 
district health clinics/provincial hospitals; vocational/secondary schools). Past 
experience in Somalia indicates that many communities want the services and will 
pay. Given present cash income collapse, payments in services and goods should be 
maximised and at least some salary payments should be made from the centre.
94. In respect to education, this approach plus the UNDP 1993 Programme's 
substantive heads - with the addition of teachers' houses which at this level are a 
more crucial priority than classrooms - form a basis for 1994-96 as well as 1993. 
Indeed, the 50,000 primary enrollment target is very ambitious - in 1987, of a nominal 
enrollment of over 110,000, spot checks suggested that under half were actually in
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class and over 2 5 %  of nominal schools were totally silent.
95. To  a more limited extent, the approach can help in respect to vocational and high 
schools. Radio programmes and cassettes could also be used to supplement "on the 
spot" teaching in the latter.
96. Similar considerations pertain in health. Central/regional laboratory and medical 
stores/drugs facilities are needed as are district health centres (headed by, say, 
Medical Officers with specialised training but not full Western doctor training 
programmes) and provincial or regional hospitals.
97. In addition, when "grab and jab" can be run down, and acute malnutrition has 
been, new surveys will be needed. Present 25 - 9 5 %  moderate and severe 
malnutrition rates (and some 1992 surveys showing under-five mortality at over 1,000 
per year) are no guide to the conditions of a return to normalcy. In particular, Vitamin 
A  Deficiency diseases (e.g. night blindness) and those of massive malnutrition (e.g. 
kwashiorkor, marasmus) were very rare indeed. Measles, diarrhoea, malaria, anaemia, 
tuberculosis, tetanus, typhoid and acute respiratory diseases were the main 
contributors to morbidity and mortality.
98. T w o  old Somali health problems now lost to sight in the emergency will need to 
return to the agenda:
* khat: a mildly narcotic leaf (analagous to coca) whose heavy use consumes 
money, reduces capacity to work while under its influence and can lead to 
violent conduct;
* female circumcision with infibulation (even Somali women who oppose it do 
not call it FGM ) which is near-universal and interacts lethally with anaemia and 
traditional birth attendants with limited or no training.
99. Unfortunately, both are deeply rooted in Somali culture and then President Barre's 
(only partially successful) ban on khat seems to have made it an icon for many of 
those who fought to overthrow him. The strength of the cultural support for female 
circumcision is underlined by the fact that the March 1993 women's workshop (a 
group of daring and forward-looking women) called not for its abolition but for its 
replacement by the least intrusive form. In both cases, studies of possible cultural 
bases to use to encourage change and long discussions with Somalis who oppose the 
practice or are willing to consider options (easier to find in the case of khat) will be 
needed before broad educational work can be begun. Instant root-and-branch 
denunciation would be counterproductive and undermine the trust needed for a 
community-based approach.
100. Water poses somewhat different issues. One special point is that in Somali law
21
and custom, all water sources belong to some group. If it does not need all the water, 
it will gladly trade some for water rights elsewhere or accept a cash or kind payment 
for it. It will not give any substantial amount free to anyone outside the kinship group. 
This point applies to residents of urban well-field areas. There is no need to provide 
jobs as guards (quite untraditional!) but jobs in maintenance, a clinic, a school, a road 
- something - need to be negotiated as payment, or the water authority will have a 
very troubled life.
101. Urban water in one sense is straightforward: gradual improvement of the patch- 
up jobs at Hargeisa plus (when possible) a parallel exercise at Kismayo. Unfortunately, 
that approach has a limited life expectancy - probably not beyond 1996 if that long. 
The Mogadishu distribution system has been on the verge of collapse since since 
1985 and some wells need redrilling; Hargeisa is only moderately better placed. The 
cost of total renewal however is daunting: probably over $ 100 million for Mogadishu.
102. Rural water in nomadic areas (and implictly dryland agro-pastoral ones) has been 
treated under livestock - strategic boreholes plus community shallow wells and 
birkets.
103. Irrigated area water supply is a problem of purity, not access. The Shebelle and 
Juba cannot be made safe to drink. Therefore encouragement for shallow well digging 
is needed - and widely acceptable. In respect to displaced persons/returnees, a food 
for work (or cash from commercialised food) labour intensive well digging programme 
would seem appropriate.
104. If the implicit central costs of these programmes seem daunting, a look at the 
revenue section may be partially reassuring. Commercialised commodity aid and a very 
simple customs system could by 1996 produce very substantial revenues.
K. G O V E R N A N C E
105. The de Facto present structure of functional civil governance in most of 
Central and Southern Somalia is UNISOM coordinating UN Agencies, the ICRC 
and some external NGOs directly with other N G O 's acting as subcontractors. 
Somali civil society including user groups are involved to greater or (usually) 
lesser degrees and significant numbers of Somali staff are employed but 
relations with local governmental authorities tend to turn on their "removing 
obstacles" (notably their armed personnel) to UN led civil 
governance/emergency operation in return for bits of resources (including bits 
of de facto recognition) from the UN led structure. In the Northwest and 
Northeast the UN civil presence is lower and there are local authorities which 
recognizably seek (with few resources or personnel) civil governance 
operations. However, again relations with the (relatively few) UN
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agencies/NGO's present is not a partnership nor even a systematic dialogue. 
Neither mode is satisfactory logically, politically or operationally now and would 
be still less so for reconstruction, rehabilitation and restructuring. To  a Somali 
the present international presence system in Somalia must appear as opaque, 
shifting and ultimately irritating as the Somali claim system and its dynamics 
do to outsiders.
106. A  top down partnership approach based on relations with a national 
government cannot be attempted because there will clearly be no operationally 
functional national government by January 1994 and it is far from certain there 
will be by January 1997. The levels on which less abnormal partnership 
relations can be built up are:
a) Civil society bodies e.g. villages, nomadic family clusters, local river 
basin farmers groups.
b) Somali women's and professional N G O 's .
c) Local governance units from urban through - say - five regional groupings 
(Northwest, Northeast, Mogadishu extending North and West, 
Mogadishu extending South and West, Kismayu/Lower Juba).
In each case initial Somali side capacity will usually be low (but not non­
existent) and mutual confidence will usually be low (in both directions). 
Building these up will be iterative and time consuming and will require capacity 
building including supporting resource and personnel bases on Somali side. 
This implies providing external transfers of Finance, training, specialist 
personnel. It is circular to assert Somali bodies are very weak because they 
have exiguous financial and expertise bases and then to deny them transfers 
because their present capacity is low.
107 A  limited number of autonomous Somali (but initially expatriate managed) 
institutions will be useful.
Examples include:
a) Mogadishu, Hargeisa and in future Kismayo water
b) Port Authorities
c) Quarantine Units
d) VHF-telephone, fax proto telecom authority
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e) A  company to wholesale/auction commercialises food aid and other
commodity aid (e.g. petroleum products).
f) By 1996 perhaps an Institute of Emission to replace the then
disintegrating Somali Shilling notes.
g) A  Customs Authority.
108. Except for e and f all the bodies should move rapidly to meeting recurrent costs 
from charges but over 1994-96 will need to seek virtually 1 0 0 %  of capital 
expenditure funding from external donors.
109. Each institution should rapidly build up a cadre of Somali skilled workers, 
technicians and managers and provide training for its staff. Qualified Somali 
personnel in most cases do exist in Somalia or abroad.
110. A t some stage these institutions would need to be made accountable to a 
functioning Somalian government (or in cases such as a (a) and (b) perhaps to 
Municipal/or provincial government. However, that will be post 1996.
Revenue
111. Apart from user charges by - e.g., water, ports, guarantine, proto­
telecommunications, the main potential local revenue sources for joint Somali - 
internal system programmes and for Somali civil society bodies would appear 
to be:
a) Commercialised commodity aid - Food aid plus (if approaches to 
traditional donors - Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait - are successful) 
petroleum aid.
♦ Food aid could yield perhaps $25 million a year and petroleum 
products aid at 200,000 tonnes a year about as much.
♦ The products would be wholesaled at market prices (say 
commercial cif plus or minus 5 % )  and the funds placed in a pool 
for allocation to joint programmes and Somali bodies;
b) Customs collected or a variant of the old Franco voluta system
♦ imports taxed or declared value or reestimate if clearly seriously 
under declared.
♦ commodity aid for commercialisation is dutiable.
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♦ three rates - 0 %  on human and animal drugs, vaccines and or 
paper for books, 4 0 %  on petroleum products and tobacco, 6 0 %  
on everything else. (capital aid projects wcould be issued 
exemptions).
♦ The system would be simple, could yield up to $65 million or 
$200 - 300 million commercial imports (out of export remittance 
proceeds and $15 million on food and other commercialised 
commodity aid).
♦ Rates would need to be low enough to avoid massive incentives 
to smuggling across land frontiers or through minor ports. Staff 
pay would need to be high enough to reduce incentives to ask 
importers to pay customs officer rather than Customs Duty to 
containable levels.
112. These tw o sources could by 1996 yield up to $130 million or $22.5 per capita 
- distinctly more than the domestic revenues plus commodity aid revenues of 
the former governent. That could finance very substantial joint programmes 
and Somali civil society and governmental authority capacity. Allocation should 
increasingly shift toward the latter and should increasingly be negotiated. 
Presumably a large share of customs would ultimately (1997?) go to local 
authority of port region which creates a special allocational issue in respect to 
Mogadish Port which will serve two regions (an excellent reason for its bieng 
an independent institution).
PERSONNEL
113. Increasingly technical assistance in training and personnel should be provided 
to Somali civil society, autonomous institution and local governance bodies to 
assist them in capacity building. In the interim joint programmes should hire, 
train, promote competent Somalis.
The purpose is to create a relationship and a national personnel developent 
policy analagous to what exists in normal countries with functional national 
governments.
114 It is also a way of ensuring that the skills of the not inconsiderable numbers of 
Somali technicians, nurses, teachers, professional and managers neither rust 
in disuse nor flow abroad and that some of those in the diaspora are drawn 
home. Otherwise the very large loss of Somalia's stock of human investment 
in middle and high level personnel which has occurred over 1987-1992 will 
continue and ultimately prove a graver barrier to moving to development than 
the physical and economic system damage inflicted by the war.
C O N C L U S IO N
115. This paper sketches a coherent set of strategic programme initiatives toward 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and restructuring over 1994-96 to lay foundations 
for a transition to sustainable, Somali led development thereafter. It articulates 
this to the level of selected key programmes, projects and institutions.
116. Clearly it is not fully articulated, has not carried individual items to the 
'bankable prospectus' stage and may well be incomplete. But until there is 
broad agreement on a framework for 1994-96 such refinement would be both 
premature, and rather arrogant on UNICEF's part.
117. Back of envelope calculations suggest an annual cost of $250-300 million 
(including commodity aid). That does not include core external agency staffs 
athough it does include personnel in particular joint programmes and projects. 
Evidently it does not include security costs. Nor does it include major capita 
projects most of which do not, in any event, seem suitable for or practicable 
within 1994-96 period.
118. What the initiative is intended to do is:
a) to restore overall consumption, production and livelihood levels to 8 0 %  -
9 0 %  of 1987 with a forward dynamic which will broadly compelete that 
process over 1997-8;
b) to restructure basic human, social and extension services on a 
sustainable basis which by 1996 will provide more access to basic 
education, health services, rural water and veterinary services than in 
1987;
c) to assist in the recapacitaron of Somali Civil society, autonomous public 
institutions and local government;
d) to lay the foundations for a 1997-2000 transition to development.
119. The words "lay the foundations" are deliberate. Certain key areas e.g. higher 
education would remain to be restructured/rehabilitated. Moreover no attempt 
has been made to identify the parameters of the structural economic 
transformation Somalia must begin to make over 2000-2010 if per capita 
output and consumption are not to be eroded. These parameters:
a) are - with one probable exception - readily identifiable;
b) the exception - Bardhere Dam/irrigation Scheme/Power Plant - would
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cost over $500 million, require an institutional and knowledge context 
not now existing and take at least six years to design, articulate and 
build;
c) and furthermore, long term structural transformation decisions cannot 
properly be taken by anyone but Somalis acting through well established, 
functioning Somali institutions.
120. Clearly this paper is not a proposed UNICEF programme of action. Its scale is 
far beyond UNICEF's capacity and many components fall well outside UN ICEF's  
area of expertise. However it is written from the perspective of enhancing the 
economic and social welfare of women and children:
a) livelihoods matter because ultimately household income (or lack of it) is 
crucial to child survival, welfare and development (or lack of it);
b) enhancing the livelihoods of poor households requires economic actions 
and provision of access to services directly relevant to them e.g. 
irrigation restoration;
c) but it also requires an enabling context e.g. quarantine stations and V H F 
telephone/fax commercial links to raise export proceeds, customs 
revenues on return imports, thus livestock prices paid and the resources 
for financing sustainable services access by poor rural households.
d) therefore UNICEF needs to take a macro perspective on 
reconstruction/rehabilitation/restructuring in Somalia today as it has done 




Tow ard Population Estimates
A. Total Population in Somalia
1986 Census1 5,500,000 - 5 ,800,000
Refugees in Somalia2 750.000
6,250.000 - 6.550.000
1987 - 1990
♦ Normal Growth3 600,000 - 625,000
♦ 'Excess' Deaths4 (150,000 - 180,000)
♦ Refugees From Somalia5 (400,000)






♦ Excess Deaths8 (750,000)
♦ Normal growth9 170,000
4,310,000 - 4 ,6 6 0 ,0 0 0 1°
(UN D P late 1992 estimate 4,900,000)
N O T E S
1. Pre cooking preliminary estimates by Swedish team.
2. Almost certainly inflated. By how many unclear. Government estimates as low
as 250,000 - 300,000 exist but are probably too low. See note 6 which averts 
need to attempt serious re~estimation.
3. About 3 %  a year
4. Largely in Northwest. 50,000 - 80,000 killed in Morgan's failed 'Pacification'
efforts; 100,000 war related deaths (probably over 6 0 %  under 5's) relating to
famine, forced migration, loss of access to health services and pure water.
25. Largely From Northwest - conservative.
6. Fragmentary data suggest perhaps 35,000 Oromo and 50,000 Ogadeni remain 
(versus 825,000 including normal population growth)
7. Late 1992 probably conservative UN HCR estimates total 919,315. A  working 
global total estimate as of early 1993 may be of the order of 1 :040,000 (see 
section B this table) less 400,000 through 1990 gives 640,000 net additional 
outflow.
8. UNICEF conservative estimate of 1992 under 5 loss of lives is 3 00,000 . 
Adding war, famine, dislocation, health service/water dearths global total 
unlikely to be less than 500,000. 1991 assumed 5 0 %  of 1992.
9. Nominal estimate. Wholesale dislocation presumptively reduced birthrate. 4 %  
used as pro forma.






♦ Saudi Arabia2 150,000
♦ Yemen2 44,000









♦ Ethiopia6 ( - )
♦ Note 2 Countries7 (75,000)
♦ Other Countries8 15,000
♦ 'Hidden' (with relatives)9 30.000




1. Probably underestimate then - certainly increased in last months of 1992.
2. Probably includes some normal migrants workers.
3. Largely Italy.
4. Post August 1992 changes and coverage adjustments.
5. More recent registered refugee estimates 400,000 plus 2 0 -3 0 ,0 0 0  floating
urban located refugees.
6. Some returnees (Northwest) as well as new refugees (Centerwest). Basic
problems is treatment of families in process of return sending out 
scouts/pioneers to assess and to begin process of return while keeping 
women/children in camps.
7. Rough estimate of normal migrant labour - basically in Saudi and Yemen but
also not insignificant numbers in Italy - probably categorised as refugees.
8. Rough guess. Small numbers are hard to cover. Tanzania has not insubstantial
9. In Kenya and Tanzania (perhaps also Saudi, Yemen) several thousand Somalis 
are living with relatives and actively avoiding identification as refugees. Could 
be up to 10,000 in Tanzania and 15-20,000 in Kenya.
10. Highly approximate. Basically 950,000 - 1 ,100,000 probable range.








c. Population Composition by Group - 1987
♦ Nomadic Pastoralist 3 5 %  - 4 0 %
♦ Agro Pastoralist/Agricultural2 3 0 %
♦ Urban 3 0 %  - 3 5 %
♦ No 1993 estimate is possible nor, given number of displaced persons, would
it be a meaningful guide to future.
♦ Post 'return home' makeup might be:
Nomadic 2 5 %  - 3 0 %
Agro-Pastoralist/Agricultural 3 0 %
Urban 4 0 %  - 4 5 %
because reestablishment of wiped out pastoral livelihoods is very difficult.
Notes:
1. Some do grow  crops and have permanent base camps for w om en and
younger children.
2. Most of these households are mixed crop growers/stock raisers. Proportions
vary with crops usually more important in river basin (especially irrigated) 
zones and livestock coequal or more important for rainfed province (e.g. Bay, 
Upper Juba) agro-pastoralists.
3. 1987 of order of 1,750,000 - 2 ,000,000 . Mogadishu (about 1 ,0 00,000 )
Hargeisa (about 500,000), Kismayu (about 150,000) dominated total with 
other towns perhaps 200,000 in all.















(3 2 %  of probable population in Somalia) are internally displaced. 
With refugees - 1 ,040,000 - total of 4 5 %  internally and 
externally displaced in 5 ,540,000  total of in Somalia plus 
refugees. This is not an inherently implausible figure. The 
comparable Mozambique estimate - including "pauperised in 
place"/wiped out after a slightly less devastating - if longer - 
conflict is 5 0 % .)
1. U N D P 'S  March 1993 estimate is "as high as one million." This excludes 
"wiped out" and "invisible". It includes firmer estimates for Mogadishu
(3 0 0 .0 0 0 ) Belet Wain/Upper Shebelle (57 ,000), Afgoi/Baido/Bardhera
(6 1 .0 0 0 ),  Kismayu (50,000) totalling 467,000. Not formally estimated are 
some secondary towns e.g. (Merca, Adale, Lugh, Kalkayo) and rural areas 
(especially Middle Shebelle, Lower Shebelle, Lower Juba) in the South plus 
the entire Northwest and Northeast. The 950,000  sub total above of the 
same order, and lack of precision, as UNDP's 1,000,000.
2. Dominantly North Mogadishu. South Mogadishu total perhaps one quarter of 
Metropolitan.
3. Urban persons (predominantly non-Hawiye) returning to home area of their 
sub-clan for safety.
4/5 Division depends how far down in size one defines town and how  far out one
goes in designating those huddling around towns for what (limited) food and 
physical security they provide as rural to urban rather than rural to rural. 
Further the two categories probably subsume up to 100,000 urban to urban.
7. 'Invisible' are displaced persons living with/dependent on relatives and those
living in houses they have occupied and existing without substantial relief or
6family transfers. Could total 250,000 or more (especially in Mogadishu, 
Hargeisa). 'Wiped out' are households not in refugee 'camps' and more or less 
on sites of old urban or rural homes but who have been pauperised and
stripped of most of their livelihood by the war. Probably concentrated in
Southern/Southcentral/riverain cropping areas and Northwestern cities/towns 
(especially Hargeisa). Likely to be of order of 250,000 or above.
8. Excludes 35,000 Oromo refugees from Ethiopia. Presumably return home and 
livelihood rehabilitation for them means to and in Ethiopia rather than Somalia.
9. The 1,450,000 total is basically a 1,300,000 - 1 ,600,000 range estimate.




This does not imply all of first two groups will or can return to rural livelihoods. 
Probably of the order of 250,000 - 400,000 will not/cannot depending in part on 
scope and resource backing of 'return home' programme. In particular, given the 
gender division of labour, a female headed household is a virtual impossibility in a 
nomadic arid, perhaps in a rainfed agro pastoralist context.
7T A B L E  T W O
A : 1987 - 1989 (Excluding meat/milk)1
Product Domestic Imported Total
(in 000 tonnes)
Maize 250 2 7 .52 277.5
Sorghum 500 102 510
Rice 5 503,5 55
Wheat 4 1 - 3 97 - 99 5 100
Beans 40 10 (?) 3 50
Vegetable Oil 30 - 35 15 (?) 3 45 - 50
(Oilseeds) (112.5) 6
Bananas 65 7 - 65
Sugar 9 - 10 115 38 125
Fish 25 - 47.5 7 9 2.5 10 27.5 -
♦ Probable grain requirement at 6 0 %  of calories/6,750,000 populatioi
• Basic 742,500
• Wastage 77,500 - 123,000 11
• Consumption Above
Basic Requirement 50,000 - 75,000 12




T O T A L  942,500
(In 1987 there was evidence of an excess supply of maize and, especially, sorghum. 
Food aid sold at prices based on an exchange rate 6 0 %  of free market was both 
shifting consumption toward wheat products and depressing grower prices.
8Notes
1. Largely derived from 1987 - 89 official agricultural statistics and secondarily 
from V. Jamal and R.H. Green Somalia: Paradoxes of Private Prosperity, 
Poverty Pockets, Volatile Vulnerability and Public Pauperization: A  Report for 
UNICEF (1987, UNICEF Somalia, Mimeo).
2. Dominantly food aid.
3. Dominantly commercial.
4. Includes wheat flour, pasta.
5. Food/aid commercial breakdown varies by year.
6. Tonnes of sim sim (sesame seed) 109,000. Assumed extraction rate about 
3 0 % .
7. Excludes exports. Adjusted for probable underestimate of household of farm 
output.
8. Wierd variations in recorded figures explained by shifts from paying customs
duty to paying customs officers which apparently oscillated.
9. Very rough estimate. Assumes 50,000 members fishing and associated
families at 100 to 150 Kg a year plus 2 ,000,000  in consuming area 
(Mogadisio, Kismayo, Hargeisa plus smaller coastal towns and villages) 
averaging 10 to 20 Kg a year. In 1987 Mogadisio had 8 fish markets (versus 
1 in 1970) believed to handle up to 80 tonnes a day (480 a week) which
would imply 25,000 tonnes a year or 25 Kg per capita.
10. Tinned sardines, tuna, etc.
11. 1 0 %  - 1 5 %  of domestic plus 2 %  to 4 %  of imported volume.
12. In most African countries beer brewing would use a substantial quantity of 
sorghum (say 10,000 tonnes per 1,000,000 people). However, in Somalia 
this was not the case. Somalia Muslims (9 9 .9 %  of population) drank very 
little beer (bottled) in towns which suggests rural (sorghum) beer consumption 
was very low albeit probably not zero.
9B. 1987 -  1989 Dietary Makeup1
Item %  Of Calories
Grain 2 50 - 60 50
Sugar 6 - 8
Vegetable Oil 3 - 5 (4)
Fruit/Vegetable 3 5 - 8 6
Beans 2 - 3 (2)
Milk 4 15 - 18 16
Meat 5 9 - 12 10
Fish 6 2 - 3 2
Other 7 1 - 2
Notes
1. Roughly estimated from part A  above and Jamal and Green Op Cit. 
Composition of diet varies widely among nomadic, agro pastoral/agricultural 
and urban groups. Milk is up to 4 0 %  of nomadic household calories. Fish 
and meat are predominately (although not only) urban consumed. Grain is 
much lower proportion of nomadic diets. Banana consumption is basically 
urban plus producing areas (Lower Juba plus Lower and Middle Shebelle).
2. While used in part A  above the 6 0 %  estimate is unconvincingly high.
3. Largest component bananas. Other significant items are watermelon,
grapefruit (usually drunk), mangoes, onions, a relative of spinach and 
tomatoes.
4. Based on V. Jamal's calculations as largely corroborated by several household 
consumption micro surveys.
5. Includes eggs and poultry (a very small component).
6. See note 9 Part A.
7. Miscellaneous, largely imported items in urban consumption.






Food Aid 3 Imports T O T A L
Maize 125 - 150 6 negl - 40 7
Sorghum 375-400 nelg - 10 575- 650
Rice 1 1 5 - 2 0
Wheat Negl 20 - 30
Beans 8 (10) 8 10 - 15 9 28 - 33
Vegetable Oil 4 3 - 5 (10) 8 15 - 20 9 28 - 35
Bananas 13 - 13
Sugar Negl (10) 8 25 - 50 9 35 - 60
Fish 5 10 - 17.5 negl 10- 17.5
Supplementary 
Feeding (Unimix, etc) 12 10 12
♦ Probable grain requirement at 6 0 %  of calories/4.500.000 p o p u la t io n
• Basic 525,000












• Food Aid 375,000 - 400,000
• Commercial imports 50,000 - 100.000
T O T A L 551,000 - 651,000 13
Notes
1. Necessarily very rough estimates/projections. All figures exclude expatriate 
consumption assumed to be over 9 5 %  imported and outside food 
aid/commercial.
11
2. Assumed to be 2 0 %  of 1987/89 base unless otherwise noted. Irrigation 
system damage and dislocation make this a relatively optimistic estimate for 
1992/93 Der plus 1993 Gu crop despite good weather. The Northwest 
outturn - especially in rainfed areas - could exceed 5 0 %  of base but is a small 
proportion (8 %  in 1988) of 'normal' territorial grain output.
3. UNDP March estimate of WFP/ICRC graing commitments is 337,0 0 0 . Other 
providers might total 33,000 - 63 ,000. No data on commitments on other 
items appear to be available.
4. Production constrained by loss of crushing capacity (including artisinal) as 
well as general irrigation system damage, dislocation seed supply factors.
5. Estimated at 35 - 4 0 %  of 1987/89. Present binding constraints are barriers 
to transport (less true Northwest/Northeast) plus collapse of effective 
purchasing power in Mogadisio and Kismayo and drastic decline in Hargeisa. 
Fishing towns - eg Adale, Merca - apparently have a surplus of fish leading to 
low prices and below typical malnutrition estimates (Adale 2 8 % ) .
6. No breakdown by grain type readily available. Probably 65 - 7 5 %  maize, 15 - 
2 0 %  wheat, 1 0 %  rice, under 5 %  sorghum.
7. Total commercial estimated at 50,000 - 100,000 - breakdown somewhat 
hypothetical. Predominately by dhow to Berbera, Basaso.
8. Desirable minimum target. No estimates of commitments (if any) exist.
9. Very rough estimates. Dominately Berbera/Basaso by dhow, secondarily 
across the Ethiopian/Kenyan land borders, perhaps some by dhow to smaller 
ports up to Adale.
10. UNICEF estimate of requirement.
11. Unfavourable conditions suggest 2 0 %  loss on domestic and 1 0 %  on 
imported.
12. Nominal. Not Ml Somalis go hungry.
13. Same order of magnitude as requirement total but dependent on top end of 
food aid range actually arriving on time (a typical of food aid) and on highly 
uncertain domestic estimate being attained.
1 2
D - 1994 Food Supply Proiection (000 tonnes)
Domestic 2 Food Aid 3,6 Commercial
Product Production








25 - 50 
5 - 15
Rice 2 50
5-7.5 5 -7 .5  8 10 - 15
Wheat 1 5 10 8 30 - 40
Beans 13 5 25 5 - 10 9
Vegetable Oil 10 - 12 - 15 - 18 9
Bananas 22 -
Sugar negl o C
O
Fish 5 12.5 - 25 -
Supplementary g10 -
Feeding
T O T A L  
360- 4 3 5  
145-155 
37 - 42 
80 - 90 
28 - 38 
40 - 45 
22 
80 
12.5 - 25 
9
♦ Probable grain requirement or same basis as A ,  B, but 5,000 population.
• Basic 577,500
• Wastage 70,500 - 74 ,000 11
• Excess consumptions 10,000 12




Food Aid - A  200,000 - 250,000
Food Aid - B 100,000
Commercial Imports 100,000
Total 650,000 - 700,000 13
Notes
1. All best 'guesstimate' projections or targets. Excludes expatriate
consumption.
2. Projected to be one third 1987/1989 base unless otherwise specified. This
be reached jf reconstruction of irrigation and security proceed reasonably well 
in 1993, and 1993/94 weather not disastrous. (If all three are favourable it 
could be exceeded - eg 4 0 %  would not be impossible).
3. Targets. A  is food aid for rations or literal food for work and B is food aid for
commercialisation.
4. This breakdown is assumed because of trend toward maize and probable 
better seed availability. In rainfed areas such a switch is undesirable from a 
food security perspective.
5. 5 0 %  of 1987/89 probably possible with security and effective demand
improvement.
6. Breakdown somewhat hypothetical for grain in A.
7. Total commercial/grain import estimate 100,000 tonnes (assuming B met).
8. Targets
9. Increased proportions via Mogadiscio, Kismayu.
10. UN ICEF estímate
11. Improved conditions allow loss reduction estimate to 1 5 %  domestic, 7 1/2% 
imports.
12. Nominal
13. Roughly in same range as requirements. But dependent on meeting at least
3 0 0 ,0 0 0  tonne grain food aid target and domestic production target (see Note 
2 above). Population estimate 4 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  + natural increase (10 0 ,0 0 0 ) 
returning refugees (400,000) is possibly conservative (high)
1 4
1996 Food Supply Projection 1 (000,000 tonnes)
Product Domestic 2 
Production





Maize 200 - 250 4 40 25 10 - 25 275 - 340
Sorghum 250 - 300 4 10 - 5 - 10 265 - 320
Rice 4 - 35 15 - 25 55 - 60
Wheat 1 - 40 50 - 75 9 0 - 1 1 5
Beans 28 2.5 10 8 5 - 10 9 45 - 50
Vegetable Oil 25 2.5 10 7.5 - 12.5 9 45 - 50
Bananas 5 45 - 50 - - - 45 - 50
Sugar negative 2.5 40 50 - 75 9 92.5  -
117.5
Fish 5 50 - - - 50
Supplementary
Feeding
- 5 - - 5 10
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♦ Probable grain requirement on same basis as A , B, C but assuming population
5,8 0 0 ,0 0 0
• Basic 660,000
• Wastage 90 ,000  11




• Food Aid - A 50,000




1. All best 'guesstimate' projections or targets. Excludes expatriate 
consumption.
2. 7 0 %  of 1987/89 projected unless otherwise noted. Given restoration 
security and non-plantation irrigation system by late 1995 and reasonable 
1995/96 weather this can be met or exceeded.
3. Targets. A  - rations or literal food for work, B - commercialised.
4. Combined total projection 525,000. Makeup dependent on degree of 
encouragement of sorghum in rainfed areas and access to seed.
5. 1 0 0 %  restoration of household farming and small estate banana production 
(but not large centrally pump irrigated estates) and 1 0 0 %  restoration fish 
production projected. Both feasible.
6. Grain targets are 50,000 A  and 100,000 B.
7. Projected total commercial grain imports 125,000. Makeup somewhat 
problematic.
8. Targets.
9. Probably about half Mogadiscio/Kismayu, 3 0 %  Bebera/Bosaso, 1 0 %  minor
ports, 1 0 %  land.
10. UNICEF estimate.
11. 1 5 %  loss on domestic, 5 %  on imported.
12. Nominal. Increase to note rise in non-poor proportion of population.
13. Balance dependant on achievement of food aid and domestic production
targets, (see Note 2 above). Population estimate of 5 ,000,000 + natural 
growth (300,000) + returning refugees (500,000) may be on conservative 
(high) side. It would imply of the order of 22 0 ,0 0 0  non-returned refugees 
(1 ,040,000  plus 8 0 ,0 0 0  population increase less 900,000  returnees).
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